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ABSTRACT
The concept of "copying" has long been involved with various aspects of intellectual property
law, particularly in regard to patents and trademarks. In the absence of legally determined
exclusive rights, "copying" is permitted, and is in fact, encouraged. However, because the term
"copying" carries an undercurrent of disapproval and unfavorable practices, it is a favorite of
patentees looking to portray an accused infringer in the most negative light, especially before a
jury. Hence, the curse of "copying." This article will review the current state of "copying" by
addressing the substantive precedent in areas where "copying" has traditionally had a
substantive effect-willfulness of any accused infringing conduct and obviousness of the
patented invention. With respect to "copying" and willful infringement, this article outlines
two important considerations that the precedent is weak upon'"copying' what?" and
"copying' when?" Lifting the curse requires care and some courage at trial, in view of a
precedential framework that is less than favorable to the accused infringer and the pejorative
impact the term "copying" will likely have on the jury and the court. These issues will be
discussed and suggestions are advanced throughout as to how one might lift the curse once it
is pronounced.

Copyright © 2008 The John Marshall Law School

Cite as Kenneth R. Adamo et al., The Curse of "Copying,"7 J.
MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 296 (2008).

THE CURSE OF "COPYING
KENNETH R. ADAMO, RYAN B. MCCRUM AND SUSAN M. GERBER*

INTRODUCTION
The concept of a "copy" or "copying" has long been involved with various aspects
of intellectual property law, particularly in regard to patents and trademarks.1 In
patent precedent, "copying" may affect issues of willfulness and obviousness, among
others. 2 In view of recent Supreme Court and Federal Circuit decisions, "copying"
may take on a more significant role in connection with such issues. 3 For example, in
view of the Federal Circuit's recent en banc decision in In re Seagate Technology,
LLC,4 which heightened the standard for proving willfulness to "objective
recklessness," 5 patentees are likely to turn more than ever to evidence of "copying" to
establish willfulness. Whether evidence of "copying" rises to the level of "objective
recklessness" remains to be seen, but patentees will certainly try to establish that it
does. 6 Moreover, now that the Supreme Court has adopted a more lenient test for
establishing obviousness, 7 evidence of "copying" has never been more important, as it
may be a powerful tool in rebutting a prima facie showing of obviousness. Indeed, in
the wake of the Supreme Court's KSR InternationalCo. v. Telelex Inc.8 decision, the
lower courts are giving increased attention to secondary considerations, including
copying.9

* Kenneth R. Adamo is a member of the Illinois, New York, Ohio and Texas Bars. Ryan B.
McCrum and Susan M. Gerber are members of the Ohio Bar. This article reflects only the present
considerations and views of the authors, which should not be attributed to Jones Day or to any of the
authors' or Jones Day's former or present clients. © 2008 Kenneth R. Adamo, Ryan B. McCrum and
Susan M. Gerber. All Rights Reserved.
Available at www.jmripl.com
'"Copying" is unquestionably an integral part of the copyright law. E.g., 17 U.S.C. § 101
(2006). This article leaves to the expertise of Professor Goldstein and others the intricacies of that
jurisprudence.
2 See Liquid Dynamics Corp. v. Vaughan Co., 449 F.3d 1209, 1225 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (noting that
copying is a relevant consideration in determining willfulness); Glaverbel Societe Anonyme v. N.
Lake Mktg. & Supply, Inc., 45 F.3d 1550, 1555 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (noting that copying is a relevant
consideration in determining obviousness).
See In re Seagate Tech., LLC, 497 F.3d 1360, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (heightening the standard
for proving willfulness); KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 127 S. Ct. 1727, 1739 (2007) (adopting a more
lenient test for establishing obviousness).
4 497 F.3d 1360.
Id. at 1371.
6 See, e.g., VNUS Med. Techs., Inc. v. Diomed Holdings, Inc., No. 05-2972, 2007 WL 3165548,
at *1 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 24, 2007) (describing that plaintiff relied almost exclusively on allegations of
"copying" to satisfy the willfulness standard articulated in In re Seagate).
7 See KSR Int'l Co., 127 S. Ct. at 1739.
8 127 S.Ct. 1727.
9 See, e.g., Muniauction, Inc. v. Thomson Corp., 502 F. Supp. 2d 477, 490 (W.D. Pa. 2007)
(finding patent not obvious).
There, the plaintiff introduced evidence that the defendant
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Because the term "copying" carries an undercurrent of disapproval, of
unfavorable practices, of "it's just not on," it is a favorite of patentees looking to
portray an accused infringer in the most negative light. In jury cases, the term is
doubly damning, in that a juror's everyday experience, stemming from earliest school
days, generates the lay biases and pejorative flavor the word "copy" carries. All too
often, fuzzy thinking and indistinct drafting has resulted in precedent which uses the
term without sufficient analysis or proper precision, painting with too broad a brush
where a refined touch is needed to avoid overreaching and misapplication of legal
theory. Such precedent then fails to preserve to the public the right freely to do that
which is not the subject of an enforceable intellectual property right. Hence the curse
of "copying": a misfortune that may arise as from retribution, without true fault,
that patentees will attempt to use to their advantage whenever possible, particularly
given the new willfulness and obviousness standards articulated in In re Seagate and
KSR.
This article will review the current state of "copying" by addressing the
substantive precedent in areas where "copying" has traditionally had a substantive
effect-willfulness of any accused infringing conduct and obviousness of the patented
invention. With respect to "copying" and willful infringement, this article outlines
two important considerations that the precedent is weak upon-"'copying' what?" and
"'copying' when?" These issues will be discussed and suggestions are advanced
throughout as to how one might lift the curse once it is pronounced.

I. "COPYING" AND THE THEORY OF ITS IMPROPRIETY

The theory of "copying" is addressed at length by Professor McCarthy, his
discussion touching upon not only trademark and unfair competition law but also
patent law. 10 A corollary to the policy of free economic competition, he states, is the
principle of free "copying" of things that are in the public domain: "Free copying and
imitation are the rule, and exclusive rights such as patents, trademarks and
copyrights are the exception."11 "A thing is in the public domain only if no

deliberately copied the patented invention. Id. at 491. This evidence supported both the jury's
conclusion of willful infringement as well as nonobviousness of the patent:
We further note that plaintiff presented sufficient evidence of secondary
considerations to shed light on the circumstances surrounding the origin of the
patented subject matter. Plaintiff presented evidence of skepticism, legally
appropriate praise, copying, and commercial success. This evidence supports the
jury's conclusion that the claims of the '099 Patent were not obvious.
Id. See also Friskit, Inc. v. RealNetworks, Inc., 499 F. Supp. 2d 1145, 1154 (N.D. Cal. 2007)
(acknowledging that "[c]opying by a competitor may be a relevant factor in the secondary factor
analysis[," but concluding that the patentee failed to introduce evidence to support its copying
claim). Cf, Asyst Techs., Inc. v. Empak, Inc., No. C 98-20451 JF (EAJ), 2007 WL 2255220, at *8
(N.D. Cal. 2007) (recognizing the significance of secondary considerations but noting that a "strong
showing of obviousness cannot be overcome based upon secondary considerations" (citing Leapfrog
Enters., Inc. v. Fisher-Price, Inc., 485 F.3d 1157, 1162 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (holding that the patent was
invalid for obviousness, despite strong showing of secondary considerations))).
101 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION, § 1.2 (4th
ed. 2003).
11 1 Id. § 1:27.
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intellectual property right protects it."12 In the context of a patent, anything
disclosed but not within the literal coverage of the claims of that patent (or another
13
patent) is in the public domain, save for the question of the doctrine of equivalents.
In 1989, the United States Supreme Court in Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder
Craft Boats, Inc. 14 restated the basic precept that the principle of free competition

and free "copying" is the rule, while exclusive rights in intellectual property are the
exception. 15 There, the Court continually emphasized the importance of maintaining
an informed balance between free competition and fair competition, that is, between
the policy of the public domain and the policy of intellectual property. 16 Bonito Boats,
in McCarthy's view, 17 qualified Judge Rich's earlier statement in Mine Safety
Applhances Co. v. Electric Storage Battery Co. 1 8 where, in rejecting a party's
contention that the patent laws put things into the public domain when a patent
expires, he wrote that:
Patent laws function only to keep things out of the publec [sic] domain
temporarily.
They have nothing to do with putting things into
it ....
Public domain" moreover, is a question-begging legal concept.
Whether or not things are in or out of the public domain and free or not free
to be copied may depend on all sorts of legal concepts includingpatent law,
antimonopoly policy and statutes, the law of unfair competition, copyright

law, and the law of trademarks and trademark registration. What we
really do is to determine these legal rights; then we may express the
ultimate conclusion by saying something is in the "public domain"-or not
in it.

19

Indeed, McCarthy notes that in Bonito Boats, Justice O'Connor took issue with
Judge Rich's generalization in this quotation to the effect that "the patent laws say
nothing about the right to copy or use."20 Instead, Justice O'Connor commented that
federal patent law "must determine not only what is protected, but also what is free
21
for all to use."
12 1

Id. § 1:31.
D. Sarnoff, Abolishing the Doctrine of Equivalents and Claiming the Future After

13 Joshua

Festo, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1157, 1176 (2004) (noting that the doctrine of equivalents operates as
a restriction on the public domain). The doctrine of equivalents extends patent protection beyond
the literal coverage of a patent's claims to possibly patentable subject matter considered to be
factually equivalent to the embodiments within those claims. Id. at 1165.
14489 U.S. 141 (1989).
15Id. at 151. Justice O'Connor notes:
[F]ree exploitation of ideas will be the rule, to which the protection of a federal
patent is the exception. Moreover, the ultimate goal of the patent system is to
bring new designs and technologies into the public domain through
disclosure.... To a limited extent, the federal patent laws must determine not
only what is protected, but also what is free for all to use.
Id.
16Id. at 146-57.
17 1 MCCARTHY, supranote 10, § 1:30.
18 405 F.2d 901 (C.C.P.A. 1969).
19 Id. at 902 n.2 (emphasis added).
20 1 MCCARTHY, supranote 10, § 1:30.
21 Bonito Boats, 489 U.S. at 151.
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"In the absence of legally defined exclusive rights," McCarthy states, "imitation
and 'copying' is permitted, and in fact, encouraged, as an essential element of free
competition.... The public interest in competition outweighs any interest in
granting a reward for ingenuity ... unless a competitor who copies these [new]
features transgresses the law ... ."22 McCarthy concludes: "[1it is permissible in a

competitive economy for the second comer to try to capture as much of the innovator's
market as it can. The limitation is that such competition must not be accomplished
by infringing on exclusive rights.
...23 In the patent context, it is the claims that

24
demarcate the exclusive rights, in the sense of a right to exclude competitors.

Theory currently appears to favor, then, the second comer as long as he or she stays
outside at least the literal coverage of the patent claims.

25

So why is "copying" so frequently alleged by plaintiffs asserting patents?
Because, as McCarthy plainly recognizes, the inherent pejorative flavor of "copying"
is plain and powerful:
"Copying"is sometimes denigratedas being somehow inherently immoral,
unfair and illegal. The popular folklore is that a "copycat"is a pirate and
that all commercial copying and imitation must be an illegal form of
competition. That is not so. In fact, legitimate copying is a large part of
what makes a free market economy work.

The successful competitor offers an identical or equivalent product at a
lower price or with greater quality. It is importantto emphasize that there
is absolutelynothinglegally or morally reprehensibleabout exact copying of
things in the public domain. It is fallacious to reason that because some
exclusive rights of intellectual property are needed as an incentive to
innovation and quality, then even more and broader rights of exclusion
would be even better for the economy. Like salt in the soup, there can be
26
too much of a good thing.
One of the areas in which "copying" can be most powerful is with respect to a claim of
willful infringement.

1 MCCARTHY, supranote 10,
23 Id.
22

24 Bell

1995).
25

§ 1:28.

Comme'ns Research, Inc. v. Vitalink Commc'ns Corp., 55 F.3d 615, 619-20 (Fed. Cir.

See 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 10, § 1:28 (noting that beyond the scope of the exclusive

intellectual property rights granted by law, imitation and copying is encouraged); Matthew D.
Powers & Steven C. Carlson, The Evolution and Impact of the Doctrine of Willful Patent
Infringement, 51 SYRACUSE L. REV. 53, 95-97 (2001) (discussing how copying or designing around
patents is encouraged).
26 1 MCCARTHY, supranote 10, § 1:28 (emphasis added).
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II.

"COPYING" AND WILLFULNESS

A. The Role of "Copying"in the Spectrum of Willful Infringement
"Copying" has had an effect on a number of areas of patent law, not the least of
which has been in helping to establish a prima facie showing of willful
infringement.2 7 In the wake of the Federal Circuit's recently issued en banc decision
in In re Seagate, the role of "copying" as it relates to willful infringement may become
even more pronounced.2 8 Future cases may include a contention that the first part of
the In re Seagate standard is prima facie satisfied by the presence of copying.
In In re Seagate, the Federal Circuit overruled the Court's previous standard for
finding willful infringement, and replaced it with a heightened standard of "objective
recklessness." 29 Relying on a number of non-patent decisions from the United States
Supreme Court, the Federal Circuit provided some guidance as to the meaning of
"objective recklessness":
fTRhe civil law generally calls a person reckless who acts in the face of an
unjustifiably high risk of harm that is either known or so obvious that it
should be known. Accordingly, to establish willful infringement, a patentee
must show by clear and convincing evidence that the infringeracted despite
an ohjectively high likelihood that its actions constituted infringement of a
valid patent. The state of mind of the accused infringer is not relevant to
this objective inquiry. If this threshold objective standard is satisfied, the
patentee must also demonstrate that this objectively-defined risk.., was
either known or so obvious that it should have been known to the accused
infringer. We leave it to future cases to further develop the application of
30
this standard.
While the Federal Circuit left it "to future cases to further develop the
application of this standard," there is little doubt that patentees will argue that
evidence of "copying," especially if blatant, will help satisfy this heightened standard,
particularly the first, "objectively high likelihood that its actions constituted
31
infringement of a [presumptively] valid patent" part of the standard.
27 See,

e.g., nCube Corp. v. SeaChange Int'l, Inc., 436 F.3d 1317, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (holding

that evidence of deliberate copying supported an award of enhanced damages); Jurgens v. CBK,
Ltd., 80 F.3d 1566, 1571 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (affirming a jury finding of willful infringement based in
part on evidence of blatant copying of a commercial embodiment of a patent); BIC Leisure Prods.,
Inc. v. Windsurfing Int'l, Inc., 1 F.3d 1214, 1223 (Fed. Cir. 1993) ("Windsurfing produced no
evidence of direct copying. The district court's determination that Windsurfing did not show
willfulness was not clearly errneous.").
28 See, e.g., VNUS Med. Techs., Inc. v. Diomed Holdings, Inc., No. 05-2972, 2007 WL 3165548,
at *3 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 24, 2007) (relying almost exclusively on allegations of "copying," the plaintiff
attempted to satisfy the willfulness standard articulated in In re Seagate).
2) In re Seagate Tech., L.L.C., 497 F.3d 1360, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
30 Id.(emphasis added) (citations omitted).
31 See, e.g., VNUS Med. Techs., Inc., 2007 WL 3165548, at *3 (relying almost exclusively on
allegations of "copying," the plaintiff attempted to satisfy the willfulness standard articulated in In

re Seagate).
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"Copying's" place in the spectrum of willfulness and enhancement of damages
was earlier explained in Read Corp. v. Porte, Inc., 32 where the Federal Circuit
33
reviewed its prior precedent on this issue, including Bott v. Four Star Corp.
Speaking generally, at first, Chief Judge Nies explained that a damages award "may
be enhanced up to three times the compensatory award," and that enhancement "is
committed to the discretion of the trial court." 34 The statutory scheme does not,
however, provide a framework for determining when such enhancement would be
appropriate.3 5 While the Federal Circuit historically approved enhanced damages
awards when the infringement is found to be willful, such enhancements are not
36
mandatory.
To gauge the egregiousness of the accused infringer's conduct, based on all the
facts and circumstances, consideration must be given to factors that render that
conduct more culpable, as well as factors that are mitigating or ameliorating.3 7 The
Read court provided a list of nine (9) factors, beginning with the Bott factors and
adding others:
(1) whether the infringer deliberately eopiedthe ideas or design of another;
(2) whether the infringer, when he knew of the other's patent protection,
investigated the scope of the patent and formed a good-faith belief that it
was invalid or that it was not infringed; and
(3) the infringer's behavior as a party to the litigation;
(4) defendant's size and financial condition;
(5) closeness of the case;
(6) duration of defendant's misconduct;
(7) remedial action by the defendant;
(8) defendant's motivation for harm; and
38
(9) whether defendant attempted to conceal its misconduct.

32 970 F.2d 816 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (superseded on other grounds as recognized in Golden Blount,
Inc. v. Robert H. Peterson Co., 438 F.3d 1354, 1368-69 (Fed. Cir. 2006)).
33807 F.2d 1567 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
34 Read Corp., 970 F.2d at 826.

35Id
36 Id.
37 Id.
38 Id. at

827 (emphasis added). While In re Seagate heightens the standard for establishing
willfulness, these considerations will likely still be useful in analyzing the issue of willfulness. See
Informica Corp. v. Bus. Objects Data Integration, Inc., No. C 02-03378 EDL, 2007 WL 3203062, at
*6 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 29, 2007) (considering the totality of the circumstances in light of In re Seagate
and determining that the plaintiff was not entitled to enhanced damages).
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As to the first factor, "copying," the court dropped footnote seven to explain that
'"ideas' and 'design' would encompass, for example, copying the commercial
39
embodiment, not merely the elements of a patent claim."
"Inasmuch as a finding of willful infringement does not mandate enhancement
of damages, the above factors taken together assist the trial court [and jury] in
evaluating the degree of the infringer's culpability and in determining whether ... to
award enhanced damages and how much, the damages should be increased." 40 To
enable appellate review, a trial court must explain the basis for the award,
particularly where the maximum amount is imposed. 41 "For the latter, the court's
42
assessment of the level of culpability must be high."

B. Analysis of Case Law Involving Allegations of "Copying"

1. Numerous Cases Have Relied on "Copying" as a Basis for Finding Willful
Infringement and/orEnhancedDamages
Historically, "copying" allegations have been the basis for a finding of willful
infringement and enhanced damages.43 "Copying" was a key factor in the finding of
willful infringement in Stryker Corp. v. Intermedics Orthopedics, Inc., 44 where the
district court based its determination in part on the fact that the accused infringer
deliberately copied the ideas or design of the patent. 45 Significantly, the Federal
Circuit in Stryker rejected the idea that a showing of "slavish copying" is needed to
support a finding of willful infringement. 46 Thus, evidence showing that the accused

31) Read Corp., 970 F.2d at 827 n.7. See also Lam, Inc. v. Johns-Manville Corp., 668 F.2d 462,
475 n.6 (10th Cir. 1982) ("[W]hen a party intentionally takes the ideas of another and puts them in
its own 'very similar' design with only nonmeaningful deviations, the party has 'copied' the other's
design."). This footnote may have brought Read Corp. into conflict with certain of the court's earlier
decisions that held that whatever was "copied" had to fall literally within the claims. Specialty
Composites v. Cabot Corp., 845 F.2d 981, 989 (Fed. Cir. 1988); Panduit Corp. v. Dennison Mfg. Co.,
810 F.2d 1561, 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1987); Stratoflex, Inc. v. Aeroquip Corp., 713 F.2d 1530, 1541 (Fed.
Cir. 1983). There can be no "copying" in the air, because the public is free to use whatever is not
covered by an intellectual property right, which, in the case of a patent, is only that which the
claims specify and (possibly) equivalents. See discussion infra Section III.C.2.
40 Read Corp., 970 F.2d at 828 (citing 7 DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS
§ 20.03(4)(b)(vi) (1991)).
41 Id. (citing 7 CHISUM, supra note 40, § 20.03(4)(b)(vi)).
42 Id. (citing 7 CHISUM, supra note 40, § 20.03(4)(b)(vi)).
43 See generally Stephanie Pall, Willful Patent Infringement: Theoretically Sound? A Proposal
to Restore Willful Infringement to its ProperPlace Within PatentLaw, 2006 U. ILL. L. REV. 659, 659
(2006) (describing the evolution of willful infringement and the importance of the copying
requirement for punitive damages).
44 96 F.3d 1409 (Fed. Cir. 1996), afFg891 F. Supp. 751 (N.D.N.Y. 1995).
5
4 Id. at 1413-14 (emphasis added); see alsoAcumed LLC v. Stryker Corp., 483 F.3d 800, 811
(Fed. Cir. 2007).
46 Stryker, 96 F.3d at 1414 ("We have found no authority in our precedent for the proposition
that the fact finder must find 'slavish copying' in order to conclude that the infringer copied the
patentee's invention.").
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infringer exactly copied the claimed invention is not necessary to establish "copying"
for the purpose of showing willfulness.
Like Stryker, "copying" was a key factor in the trial court's finding of willful
infringement in Kaufman Co. v. Lantech, Inc.,47 the court finding that Kaufman
faithfully "copied" the claimed invention. 48 On appeal, Kaufman argued that an
award of increased damages was improper since its "copying" activities took place
49
before the patent issued, and its infringement ceased four months after issuance.
The court rejected Kaufman's argument because the evidence demonstrated
50
Kaufman's intentional "copying" activities constituted willful infringement.
Similarly, in nCube Corp. v. SeaChange International,Inc., 51 "copying" was an
important factor in the trial court's decision to award enhanced damages. 52 In
nCube, the evidence established that "SeaChange deliberately copied the invention in
its products without investigating the scope of the patent" and, thus, "had not formed
a good faith belief excusing its conduct." 53 As a result, the court awarded enhanced
54
damages.
In Pacific FurnitureManufacturingCo. v. Preview FurnitureCorp.,55 evidence of

"copying" also led to an award of increased damages in a design patent infringement
case. 56 The infringer had direct access to the patented chairs; its chairs were
57
virtually identical to those of patentee, and it admitted "copying" the chair designs.
Finding the infringer's opinion of counsel evidence insufficient, the court held that
58
the infringement was willful.

In some cases, a finding of willful infringement was based, at least in part, on
activity that occurred before the asserted patent issued. 59 For example, in Stryker
Corp. v. Davol Inc.,60 the Federal Circuit affirmed a finding of willful infringement
61
despite the fact that the copying predated the issuance of the asserted patent.
Similarly, in Avia Group InternationalInc. v. L.A. Gear California, Inc., 62 L.A.
Gear ("LAG"] tried to overturn the district court's enhanced damages award, arguing
that much of its accused conduct occurred before the patents issued. 63 The Federal
Circuit rejected this argument:

47807 F.2d 970 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
48

Id. at 978.

4 Id. at 977-78.
5oId. at 979.
51436 F.3d 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
52 Id. at

1325.

53Id.
54Jd

55626 F. Supp. 667 (M.D.N.C. 1985), affd, 800 F.2d 1111 (Fed. Cir. 1986).

IId.at 676.
57Jd

58

Id. at 677-78.

59See discussion infra Section IJ.C.1 (discussing how the Federal Circuit's views on this point
have varied).
(30
234 F.3d 1252 (Fed. Cir. 2000).

Id. at 1259-60.

(1
(32853
(

F.2d 1557 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
Id.at 1566.
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LAG's contention that infringement could not be willful because the
patents issued after LAG placed its last order is unavailing. "The fact that
[an infringer] may have started its infringement before the patents issued
(or before [it was] aware of the patents) does not bar an award of increased
damages or attorney fees." LAG continued to sell the infringing shoes after
the patent issued, well after it had notice the patent was pending for a
particulardesign, and even after this suit for infringement was filed. By
64
such conduct, LAG intentionally accepted the risk of infringement.
In contrast to these authorities, the Federal Circuit in State Industries, Inc. v.
A. 0. Smith Corp.65 focused the issue of willful infringement on activity that occurred
after the asserted patent issued and found that the accused infringement had not
been willful. 66 In State Industries, the Federal Circuit found that "[t]o willfully
infringe a patent, the patent must exist and one must have knowledge of it."67 The
Federal Circuit concluded that because State did not have the patent-in-suit until "22
days before suit, Smith had a perfect right to make and sell its LIME TAMER,
without question, because State had no 'patent rights' which covered it."68 The
Federal Circuit distinguished Milgo Electronic Corp. v. United Business
Communications, Inc. 69 because there the defendant had engaged in "a most
elaborate and detailed copying ('slavish copying' according to the trial judge) of
complex electronic circuitry in a 'modem' by a corps of engineers working in secrecy
over a period of a couple of years to pry loose the secret of Milgo's inventions," in
contrast to the State Industries defendant who copied a device before it had been
7 0
patented.
State Industries, then, suggests that punishable "copying" could not take place
before issuance of the patent, because one willfully infringes a patent, more precisely,
the issued claims of a patent, not a product or a product which later turns out to be
covered by the claims of the later-issued patent.7 1 Under State Industries,issuance
of the patent did not, retroactively-nune pro tune, as it were (or ex post facto,
insofar as impact is concerned)-convert Smith into a willful infringer.7 2 The State
Industries court did not view the pre-issuance "copying" as an inchoate basis for a
later finding of willfulness, which might mature into a problem for the accused
73
infringer at a later date.
The varying views expressed in the foregoing cases (e.g., Stryker, Avia, Mlgo,
and State Industries)highlight the uncertainty in the law regarding when "copying"
64 Id. at 1566 (citations omitted); see also Milgo Elec. Corp. v. United Bus. Commc'ns, Inc., 623
F.2d 645, 666 (10th Cir. 1980) (finding that "copying" activities that took place before the asserted
patent issued were relevant to the issue of willful infringement).
( 751 F.2d 1226 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
66 Id.
at 1236.

(37Id.
(38Id.

at 1237.
623 F.2d 645.
70 State Industries, 751 F.2d at 1238; see also Deere & Co. v. Int'l Harvester Co., 658 F.2d
1137, 1147 (7th Cir. 1981) (distinguishing Migo on the fact that the Milgo defendant made no effort
to secure an opinion of counsel).
71 State Industries,751 F.2d at 1236.
72 Id. at 1237.
69

73 Id.
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can result in willfulness. This issue is discussed infra in the discussion of 'Copy'
When?"74

2. Opinions of Counsel Do Not NecessarilyInsulate an Accused InfringerFrom a
Findingof Willful Infringement
Even when an accused infringer has obtained opinions of counsel, evidence of
"copying" can result in a finding of willful infringement and enhanced damages.7 5
For example, evidence of "copying" was critical in the trial court's finding of willful
infringement in Liquid Dynamics Corp. v. Vaughan Co.76 despite the fact that the
accused infringer had obtained and relied on opinions of counsel.77 On appeal,
Vaughan argued that there was no basis for the jury to disregard its reliance on an
opinion of counsel and that there was insufficient evidence to conclude Vaughn
copied the claimed invention.78 Relying mostly on circumstantial evidence and
inferences, the court affirmed the finding that Vaughan's "copying" activities
nonetheless constituted willful infringement.7 9 The court concluded that Vaughan's
80
opinions of counsel were unreliable because they were based on erroneous facts.
A number of other cases track the analysis in Liquid Dynamics. For example, in
Jurgens v. CBK, Ltd.,81 the accused infringer presented evidence that it immediately
contacted an experienced attorney and obtained an opinion that either it was not
infringing or that the patent was invalid when it learned of its potential
infringement.8 2 The jury found that the accused infringer's conduct was willful, but
the trial judge declined to award enhanced damages because the defendants
immediately sought the advice of counsel.83 The Federal Circuit affirmed the finding
of willfulness, but reversed the trial judge's decision not to award enhanced
damages. 8 4 The Federal Circuit also reversed the trial court's decision not to award
85
attorney's fees.
See infra Section C.1.
75Liquid Dynamics Corp. v. Vaughan Co., No. 01C 6934, 2005 WL 711993, at *2 (N.D. Ill.
March 22, 2005), anEd, 449 F.3d 1209 (Fed.Cir. 2006). Where an opinion of counsel will fitinto a
post-In -reSeagate analysis remains to be worked out by the Federal Circuit, but it may well have
effect in regard to the second part of the new willfulness standard, if the "copying" prima facie
satisfies the first part of the standard. In re Seagate Tech., L.L.C., 497 F.3d 1360, 1371 (Fed. Cir.
2007).
762005 WL 711993, at *2.
77 Id
7SLiquidDynamics,449 F.3d at 1225.
79Id.at 1225-26.
80 Id.at 1226.
SI 80 F.3d 1566 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
82 Id.at 1571.
83 Id.at 1571-72.
81 Id.at 1573. Similarly, in Stryker Corp. v. Davol Inc., the Federal Circuit affirmed the jury's
verdict of willful infringement despite the accused infringer's reliance on opinions of counsel. 234
F.3d 1252, 1260 (Fed. Cir. 2000). The court in Stryker noted that "the jury reasonably could have
credited the testimony that [the accused infringer's] reliance on the opinions of counsel was not
reasonable, that it did not in fact follow those opinions, and that the designs for the accused devices
were finalized before obtaining an opinion of counsel." Id. at 1259. See also VNUS Med. Techs., Inc.
v. Diomed Holdings, Inc., No. C-05-2972 MMC, 2007 WL 3165548, at *3-4 (N.D. Cal. Oct 24, 2007)
71
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In a jury trial, a finding of willfulness when the accused infringer relied on
opinions of counsel, might be expected to fall before a Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, Rule 50, judgment as a matter of law ("JMOL"), motion. This is not
necessarily true. In Amsted Industries,Inc. v. Buckeye Steel Castings Co.,86 Buckeye
moved for JMOL or a new trial on the issues of willful infringement and damages,
while Amsted moved for enhanced damages and attorneys' fees.8 7 The trial court
refused to set aside the jury's verdict of willful infringement and granted Amsted's
motion for enhanced damages and attorneys' fees.88 On appeal, Buckeye argued that
no reasonable jury could have found that infringement was willful.8 9 In support of
this argument, Buckeye relied on written opinions and the testimony of its
engineering director that the decision to copy was made only after forming a good
faith belief that the patent was invalid. 90
In setting the legal standard applicable to Buckeye's position, the court stated
that just because "an opinion of counsel was obtained does not 'always and alone'
dictate a finding that the infringement was not willful."91 "What matters is the
nature of that opinion and what effect it had on an infringer's actions." 92 Close
scrutiny of both the outside counsel opinions and the engineering director's "good
faith belief' showed that the validity opinions relied upon were not final, requests for
review and further information to opining counsel had not been answered, and, in
fact, the opinions may have been provided, even in preliminary form, on the basis of
less than all existing information supportive of the patent's validity.9 3 Enhancement
of damages, therefore, was affirmed, inter alia, on the basis of Buckeye's deliberate
"copying," in view of Read Corp. v. Portec,Inc. 94
Transmatic, Inc. v. Gulton Industries, Inc.,95 however, had a different outcome,
despite Gulton's alleged effort to make a "clone" of the patented invention.9 6 At least
six opinions had been received from Gulton's patent counsel on whether or not its
97
efforts to develop a device to compete with Transmatic would infringe the patent.
In reviewing the Bott factors as to increased damages, the court disarmed the "hotbutton" term, "clone," quite adroitly, stating that the "Defendant experimented with
a number of possibilities in an effort to design around the patent," and that "the
product that Gulton ultimately went to market with was not an exact clone of the
Domas patent."98 Moreover, the court noted in a footnote that even if the accused
(denying motion for summary judgment of no willful infringement even though the accused infringer
was relying on opinions of counsel; alleged "copying" was the basis for asserting willfulness).
8"Jurgens, 80 F.3d at 1572.
86 24 F.3d 178 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
87 Id.at 181.
88 Id.
89 Jjd
90 Id.

91 Id.at 182.
92 Jjd

93 Id.
94 Id.at 183-84.
95849 F. Supp. 526 (E.D. Mich. 1994), affdinpart,rev'dinpa-rt,53 F.3d 1270 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
96 Id.at 532. In an internal Gulton memorandum, Gulton's president, David Turney, urged the
use of a "clone" of Transmatic's patented product. Id.
97 Id
98 Id.

at 536.
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device were a direct copy, that fact would not be dispositive proof of willfulness if the
defendant had a good faith, well-informed belief that the patent was invalid. 99
Thus, an opinion and a good faith belief of invalidity may fend off a "copying"based willfulness charge where the "copying" is contended to prima facie satisfy the
first part of the In re Seagate willfulness standard, and a perceptive court, on posttrial, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 50 motion and enhancement motion
practice, 100 may itself prevent any untoward or undeserved damage done by use of a
prejudicial term such as "clone" before a jury.
When "copying" is present, these cases demonstrate the potential, continued
importance of competent advice of counsel and good faith reliance thereon, and/or
other evidence of good faith in proceeding after the accused infringer had knowledge
of the patent being infringed, to dissipate any prima facie willfulness effects
"copying" may cause under In re Seagate'swillfulness standard.

3. The Importance of DesigningAround
The Federal Circuit has noted in a number of rulings that any "copying" that
results from an unsuccessful effort to "design around" the claimed invention will
most likely not result in an inference or finding of willfulness, and hence exposure to
multiple damages and attorneys fees on that basis. 10 1 There should be no different
result under In re Seagate.
The importance of "designing around" towards ameliorating the effects of a
10 2
charge of "copying" was pointed out by Judge Rich in State Industries.
In that
case, the court reversed the trial court's holding of willfulness, finding State's case "to
be fatally flawed as based on a mixture of fact with non-fact and erroneous legal
presumptions."' 10 3
The court discussed at length the evidence supporting the
defendant's efforts to design around:
Conduct such as Smith s, involving keeping track of a competitor's
products and designing new and possibly better or cheaper functional
equivalents is the stuff of which competition is made and is supposed to
99 Id. at 536 n.12. The court stated: "It is simply not a willful infringement if there is a good
faith, well-informed belief that the patent itself is invalid." Id. "Copying may be probative of a
'willful infringement,' but it is not dispositive." Id.
100 FED. R. Civ. P. 50; 35 U.S.C. §§ 284, 285 (2006) (granting the court discretion to award
treble damages and attorneys' fees in patent infringement cases). In Transmatic, the court had
earlier ruled that infringement under the doctrine of equivalents and willful equivalent
infringement were matters for the court, not the jury. Transmatie, 849 F. Supp. at 529 n.4. The
jury rendered an advisory verdict on equivalents infringement, but not on willfulness. Id. at 529.
That ruling explains the procedural status of the willfulness/enhancement issues in TransmatiP as
to how willfulness was an issue for the court and not the jury. Id. It also may indicate lack of the
usual, expected impact of a term such as "copy" or "clone" upon a jury, because willfulness was not
decided by them. Id.
101 So, e.g., Westvaco Corp. v. Int'l Paper Co., 991 F.2d 735, 745 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (noting that
although Westvaco unsuccessfully attempted to design around Int'l Paper Co.'s product, '[it] should
not be found to have willfully infringed based on its attempt").
102 State Indus., Inc. v. A.O. Smith Corp., 751 F.2d 1226 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
103 Id. at 1234.
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benefit the consumer. One of the benefits of a patent system is its so-called
"negative incentive" to "design around"a competitors products, even when
they are patented, thus bringing a steady flow of innovations to the
marketplace. It should not be discouraged by punitive damage awards
except in cases where conduct is so obnoxious as clearly to call for them.
The world of competition is full of "fair fights," of which this suit seems to be
104
one.
Applying the same analysis as it did in State Industries,the Federal Circuit in
Amstar Corp. v. Envirotech Corp.,10 5 found there was no error in refusing to find
willfulness. 10 6 There, the accused infringer tried to work its way clear of the patentin-suit. "After being advised of Amstar's claim of infringement, [Envirotech] engaged
in a good faith colloquy with Amstar and modified its.., design in an attempt, albeit
unsuccessful, to avoid infringement."' 10 7 While the evidence was susceptible to
multiple interpretations, the Federal Circuit deferred to the jury's determination
that Envirotech attempted to design around the patent, and its infringement was not
willful.108

The benefits of "designing around" are also evident from the Federal Circuit's
decision in Read Corp. v. Portec, Inc.10 9 In that case, Read had pressed Portec's
"copying" as the key to its enhancement case. 110 The Federal Circuit considered
those allegations. It recognized that determining when a patented device has been
"designed around" enough to avoid infringement is a difficult determination to make,
and that Portec was properly found liable for damages caused by its miscalculation
respecting infringement of the patent.1 11 However, the court concluded that Portec's
conduct was not sufficiently egregious to justify finding it had willfully infringed,
because there was no evidence contradicting Portec's claim that it had tried to design
112
around the '194 patent.
Westvaco Corp. v. International Paper Co. 113 exemplifies just how important
evidence of designing around can be, even when minimal. At the trial court level, the
court found that Westvaco's infringement was willful, based upon its conclusion that
Westvaco had copied International Paper's ("IPC") product, a carton for holding
101Id. at 1235-36 (emphasis added); see also Rolls-Royce Ltd. v. GTE Valeron Corp., 800 F.2d
1101, 1109-10 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (affirming the trial court's holding that the infringer did not willfully
infringe the patent-in-suit because it designed around the patent claims instead of intentionally
copying them); Yarway Corp. v. Eur-Control USA, Inc., 775 F.2d 268, 277-78 (Fed. Cir. 1985)
(holding licensor-infringer's attempt to "design around" licensed patent, which attempted to avoid
exclusive license granted to plaintiff, coupled with a non-frivolous attempt to avoid infringement by
changed design, was not sufficiently obnoxious to premise the enhancement of damages, because it
advanced one of the purposes of the patent law, to encourage "design around" activities).
105, 823 F.2d 1538 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
106 Id. at 1546-47.
107 Id. at 1547.
108 Id. at 1546-47.
109 970 F.2d 816 (Fed. Cir. 1992), abrogated on other grounds by Markman v. Westview
Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967 (Fed. Cir. 1995), aftfd, 517 U.S. 370 (1996).
110 Id. at 828.
111
112

Id.
Id. at 830 (holding that the factors of willful infringement and copying were not present

where Portec had "successfully 'designed around' [Read's] patent").
113 991 F.2d 735 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
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orange juice. 114 The Westvaco employee that had developed the accused product, Dr.
Debora Massouda, kept a lab notebook that included the notation "trying to duplicate
IP[C] structure." 115 Westvaco obtained an opinion of counsel that concluded that the
116
accused product did not infringe any valid claims of the patent-at-issue.
In finding the infringement to be willful, the trial court cited its findings
regarding the references to IPC's product in Dr. Massouda's notebook and outline:
A finding of willfulness is not precluded by the fact that Westvaco
sought validity and infringement opinions from competent outside counsel.
Here, Westvaco engaged in deliberate and obvious attempts to copy
successful IPC] products after IP[C] patented the structures embodied by
the products. Westvaco should not be insulated from increased damages
and an attorney's fee award by its after-the-fact efforts to justify these
actions by encouraging positive opinions from an initially uncertain outside
counsel.

117

Despite a starting point that certainly had all of the trappings of improper
"copying," the Federal Circuit reversed the lower court, recharacterizing Westvaco's
conduct as
appropriate attempts to "design around" as opposed to wrongful
"copying."118
Even though Dr. Massouda stated that Westvaco was trying to
"duplicate" the structure of IPC's product, the Federal Circuit determined that
"Westvaco made specific structural changes to its product so that its product was not
a copy of IPC's product" and evidenced an attempt to design around IPC's product.1 19
Based on the foregoing, evidence of designing around the asserted patent can
weigh heavily against a finding of willful infringement. 120 However, care must be
given not to abandon one's own independent design efforts and "copy" a patented
121
invention, because a willfulness finding may result.

115

Id. at 740.
Id. at 738.

116

Id.

114

117 Id.

at 740 (citations omitted).

11s

Id. at 745.

119

Id.

Soo Baxter Diagnostics, Inc. v. AVL Scientific Corp., 924 F. Supp. 994, 1020 (C.D. Cal. 1996)
(noting that attempts to design around the patent may also negate a finding of willfulness); Mobil
Oil Corp. v. Amoco Chems. Corp., 779 F. Supp. 1429, 1484-85 (D. Del. 1991), affd, 980 F.2d 742
(Fed. Cir. 1992) (finding that Amoco scientists used Mobil patents to develop the infringing catalyst,
but that the activity did not amount to copying, because Amoco legitimately attempted to "design
around" the Mobil patents); Schering Corp. v. Precision-Cosmet Co., 614 F. Supp. 1368, 1383 (D.
Del. 1985) (doubling damages rather than tripling them, where defendant did not simply copy
patent owner's product, but had been independently developing own product); Atlas Powder Co. v.
E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 588 F. Supp. 1455, 1472-73 (N.D. Tex. 1983), affd, 750 F.2d 1569
(Fed. Cir. 1984) (finding that infringer did not simply copy patent owner's product but rather in good
faith did basic research to develop an improved product); 7 CHISUM, supra note 40,
§ 20.03(4)(b)(v)(G) (noting that "designing around' patented technology is a positive benefit of the
patent system, not to be punished by multiple damage awards"); ef Chaparral Indus. Inc. v. Boman
Indus., 697 F. Supp. 1113, 1125 (C.D. Cal. 1988) (finding willfulness where Boman, in copying the
patented invention, attempted to "design around" it but merely created a "functional equivalent").
121 Se Critikon, Inc. v. Becton Dickinson Vascular Access, Inc., 120 F.3d 1253, 1260 (Fed. Cir.
1997) (finding that the district clearly erred in finding no willful infringement because it "overlooked
120
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C. IMPORTANT CONSIDERATIONS CONCERNING WILLFUL INFRINGEMENT
"COPY" WHEN? & "COPY" WHAT?

Two key concepts have been alluded to and/or addressed in passing to this point
in connection with the issue of willful infringement: 'Copy' when?" and 'Copy'
what?" In truth, these are the linchpins by which the theory of "copying" is held
together. Because it is here that the precedent sometimes staggers or falls down,
these issues require careful thought and analysis.

1. "Copy" When?
That an accused infringer begins conduct later challenged as infringement
before a United States patent has issued, or before he or she became aware of an
issued United States patent, apparently does not per se bar a finding of willfulness
on that basis, according to the Federal Circuit's current view. 122 Infringement, and
any basis for increasing thereafter-incurred damages, however, cannot begin until
123
the issuance of a U.S. patent and notice of the existence of the U.S. patent.
Whether willfulness thereafter exists in that infringement should be judged by the
"totality of the circumstances," including the presence of opinions of counsel and
other evidence of good faith conduct.124
The Federal Circuit's governing precedent in these "jump the gun" infringement
situations is represented by Gustafson, Inc. v. Intersystems Industrial Products
Inc.125 Prior to Gustafson, Donald S. Chisum notes that "Federal Circuit decisions
have oscillated on the question of willfulness when the infringer allegedly copied the

overwhelming evidence in the record that Becton Dickinson's efforts to develop a safety catheter
were a failure" as "it must be more than coincidence that Becton Dickinson managed to
commercialize its design by adopting features disclosed in the [asserted patents] soon after it
became aware of their existence"); W.R. Grace & Co.-Conn. v. Intercat, Inc., 7 F. Supp. 2d 425, 475
(D. Del. 1997), a/c, 155 F.3d 572 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (finding willful infringement because although
there was evidence that the defendant attempted to design around, the plain fact was that the new
product was practically identical to the patented product); Padco Inc. v. Newell Cos., 13 U.S.P.Q.2d
1607, 1610 (E.D. Wis. 1988), a/d, 878 F.2d 1445 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (finding willful infringement where
Newell abandoned independent design efforts and intentionally copied Padco's patented paint roller
to prevent loss of sales of other products).
122 See, e.g., Shiley Inc. v. Bentley Labs., Inc., 794 F.2d 1561, 1568 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (disagreeing
with Bentley's assertion that "since it began to market its infringing device a month before any of
Shiley's patents issued, its infringement cannot be willful as a matter of law").
123 State Indus., Inc. v. A.O. Smith Corp., 751 F.2d 1226, 1236 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
124 Graco, Inc. v. Binks Mfg. Co., 60 F.3d 785, 792 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (holding that "[t]here are no
hard and fast rules regarding a finding of willfulness and that "a number of factors enter into a
willfulness determination and, as such, the issue is properly resolved by evaluating the totality of
the surrounding circumstances" (citations omitted)). While the standard for establishing willfulness
may have changed under In re Seagate , there is no reason to believe that the proper analysis for
determining whether that standard has been met is anything other than an analysis of the totality
of the circumstances. See Trading Techs. Int'l, Inc. v. eSpeed, Inc., No. 04 C 5312, 2008 WL 63233,
at *1 (N.D. Ill. 2008) (finding that '[In re] Seagate did not alter the requirement that the totality of
the circumstances must be taken into account when determining whether infringement was
willful").
125 897 F.2d 508 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
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patentee's technology before the patent issued." 126 One line of authority provided
that pre-issuance "copying" could not evidence willfulness, 127 while another line of
128
authority found to the contrary.

129
According to Chisum, Gustafson effectively reconciled the two lines of cases.

In that decision, the court notes that, in a sequence of cases involving claims of
willful infringement, the Federal Circuit "has evolved a jurisprudence applicable to
situations in which a product found an [sic] infringement at trial had been

126

7 CHISUM, supra note 40, § 20.03(4)(b)(v)(H).

See State Indus. Inc. v. Mor-Flo Indus., Inc., 17 U.S.P.Q.2d 1706, 1709 (E.D. Tenn. 1990),
afT ,948 F.2d 1573 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (noting that "copying... [does not constitute] evidence of willful
infringement of a patent, inasmuch, as there was no patent at that time, and no indication that
there was even a patent pending" (citation omitted)); State Indus. v. A.O. Smith Corp., 751 F.2d
1226, 1235 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (finding that there was no willfulness and that the case merely involved
"the familiar picture of competitors competing, one trying to match a new product of the other with a
new product of its own, not copied but doing the same job, and the other manipulating its secret
pending patent application to cover the functionally competitive structure"); Am. Original Corp. v.
Jenkins Food Corp., 774 F.2d 459, 465-66 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (noting that the trial court did not err in
declining to increase damages when defendant began developing its process before issuance of the
patent; the infringer did not obtain an opinion letter of counsel after issuance of the patent; accused
infringer did alter its system in the hope of avoiding infringement; and the patent owner never
notified the infringer of the charge of infringement until filing suit); John 0. Butler Co. v. Block
Drug Co., 620 F. Supp. 771, 779 (N.D. Ill. 1985) (finding no willful infringement when the defendant
did not know of the plaintiffs design patents when it began production and learned of those patents
only after suit was filed against it).
128 See Stryker Corp. v. Davol Inc., 234 F.3d 1252, 1259 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (rejecting Davol's
argument that willfulness should not be found where copying involved predated the issuance of the
patent); Shiley Inc. v. Bentley Labs., Inc., 794 F.2d 1561, 1568 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (disagreeing with
Bentley's assertion that "since it began to market its infringing device a month before any of Shiley's
patents issued, its infringement cannot be willful as a matter of law"); see also Avia Group Intl, Inc.
v. L.A. Gear Cal., Inc., 853 F.2d 1557, 1566 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (noting that "LAG's contention that
infringement could not be willful because the patents issued after LAG placed its last order [was]
unavailing"); Milgro Elec. Corp. v. United Bus. Commc'ns, Inc., 623 F.2d 645, 665-66 (10th Cir.
1980) (copying prior to issuance of patent: "there can be no liability for infringement before a patent
issues ....[but] the issue here is not infringement, but rather willfulness, that is UBC's state of
mind"); GTE Prods. Corp. v. Kennametal Inc., 772 F. Supp. 907, 918 (W.D. Va. 1991) (noting that
although the accused infringer copied the product of the patent applicant before the patent issued
and that after issuance, it re-designed away from the patent, there was still willful infringement for
the period before re-design); Joy Mfg. Co. v. CGM Valve & Gauge Co., 730 F. Supp. 1387, 1393, 1398
(S.D. Tex. 1989) (finding willfulness where the accused valves were designed based on patentee's
product, were substantially identical, and defendant did not get a written opinion of counsel nor did
it modify the design of the accused valves); Afros S.p.A. v. Krauss-Maffei Corp., 671 F. Supp. 1402,
1438 (D. Del. 1987) (noting that "[t]he issue of willfulness does not rest solely on the timing or
knowledge of the patent, but on the totality of the circumstances") (citations omitted), affd mem.,
848 F.2d 1244 (Fed. Cir. 1988); Indecor Inc. v. Fox-Wells & Co., 642 F. Supp. 1473, 1491-92
(S.D.N.Y. 1986) (noting that "[a]n infringer's decision to continue production after notice of a patent
is evidence of willfulness" and that Fox-Well's failure to conduct a patent search or to receive an
opinion of counsel as to the validity of the '195 Patent serve [sic] to aggravate the circumstances").
The court in Indecorwent on to note that "[While] Fox-Well's copying of the Indecor fabric before the
patent was issued does not constitute infringement ...[such] copying activities provide evidence
that its conduct in manufacturing and selling [the infringing product after issuance of the patent]
was 'intentional and deliberate, in willful disregard of [Indecor's] rights, rather than merely
accidental or negligent."' Id. (citations omitted).
129 7 CHISUM, supra note 40, § 20.03(4)(b)(v)(H).
127
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manufactured before the patent issued." 130 When one learns of the U.S. patent
coincident with filing of suit, such as being sued on the day the patent issues,
Gustafson says, as Chisum reads it, no pre-issuance "copying" may be used as
evidence of willfulness if one continues the pre-suit challenged course of conduct; the
accused infringer is relieved of the inchoate risk. 131
However, when one has
knowledge of the U.S. patent before suit is filed, even if the delay between knowledge
and suit is a matter of days, the inchoate risk may vest and then must be dealt with.
A showing of the propriety of continuing the pre-issuance conduct may need to be
made, and/or the alleged "copying" disproved, to avoid "copying" acting as proof of
satisfaction of the In re Seagate willfulness standard.
Under Gustafson, then, the true nature of the curse of "copying" shows through:
pre-issuance "copying," which is entirely legal and proper, and in fact favored by
theory and Constitutional rights and benefits, presents an inchoate risk of a finding
of willfulness and all of the horrors that that may bring.13 2 This inchoate risk may
vest, as it were, if what was "copied" later turns out to fall literally within the claims
of a subsequently issued United States patent, as properly construed under the
Federal Circuit's well-defined rules of claim construction. And if Read Corp.'s
footnote seven is broadly read, that risk may arise from "copying" the patentee's
product or portions of disclosure, even if that product or that disclosure does not
133
literally encroach upon the claims that later issue.
13 4
In one post- Gustafson decision, Conopeo, Inc. v. May DepartmentStores Co.,
the Federal Circuit vacated and remanded the trial court's findings as to willfulness,
but affirmed the findings of infringement as to two of the defendant's products. On
remand, the trial court was cautioned to avoid finding willfulness based upon the
defendant's conduct before the patent issued:
In resolving the willfulness, enhanced damages, exceptional case, and
attorney fees issues, the court is cautioned not to place undue weight on
defendants' activities prior to the issuanee of the patent. Although these
activities may have been undertaken with knowledge that a patent
application covering the relaunched lotion formulation was pending (in view
of the "patent pending" notice affixed to the relaunched product), that is
13 5
insufficient to support a finding of willfulness.
The patent-in-suit in Conopeo issued, and the lawsuit was filed one month
later.136 The defendants did not have actual knowledge of the patent until the

130 Gustafson, 897 F.2d at 510.

131 7 CHISUM, supra note 40, § 20.03(4)(b)(v)(H).
1:32Gustafson, 897 F.2d at 510-11.
133 Read Corp., v. Portec, Inc., 970 F.2d 816, 827 n.7 (Fed. Cir. 1992). Note that in Read Corp.,
the copied commercial device did literally fall within claims of the '194 patent found to be infringed.
Id. at 825.
134 46 F.3d 1556 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
135 Id. at 1562 (emphasis added).
136 Id. at 1560.
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lawsuit was filed. 137 The court's cautionary instruction on remand is consistent with
138
Gustafson, as interpreted by Chisum.

2. "Copy" What?
The courts have also been uncertain regarding what it is that one must "copy" to
engage in prohibited conduct, as cases noted supra have demonstrated. Even the
Federal Circuit has and is seemingly suffering from a diffusion of views on this
critical issue.
The Seventh Circuit had earlier wrestled with the 'copy' what?" issue in Union
Carbide Curp. v. Graver Tank & Manufacturing Co., 13 9 where the Master's report on
damages was before the court.1 40 The Master had found that Lincoln's 660 flux,
which was found to infringe only under the doctrine of equivalents, "was copied from
the teachings of the patent." 141
Based upon that finding, the trial court
"characterized Lincoln as a conscious and willful infringer, notwithstanding that the
Master had refused" to do so.142 The Seventh Circuit reversed that finding, both as a
143
matter of fact and law.
In coming to this conclusion, the court considered the issue of exactly what
Lincoln had copied. It did not appear that the product claimed by the patent had
been copied, but rather it appeared that what was disclosed by the specification,
rather than that specified in the claims, had been copied.144 More to the point, the
court stated that "[i]t strikes us as an anomaly to find that Lincoln copied from the
patent but that infringement was found only by application of the doctrine of
equivalents." 145 Hence, "[i1n our view, the word 'copied' as used [to] describe Lincoln's
conduct is a misnomer. It is a conclusion arrived at by process of reasoning with
which we do not agree." 146 For this reason, and because Lincoln had obtained an
opinion of invalidity or non-infringement, the court concluded the infringement was
not willful. 147 As Union Carbide plainly points to the issued claims of the patent as

137 Conopco, Inc. v. May Dept. Stores Co., 784 F. Supp. 648, 662 (E.D. Mo. 1992), affd in part,
rev'dinpart,46 F.3d 1556.
138 7 CHISUM, supra note 40 § 20.03(4)(b)(v)(H) (discussing the Federal Circuit's holding in

Gustafson and noting that a defendant "could not be a willful infringer when the trial court had
found that the defendant was aware of the two patents in question 'as of the filing of suit on the
two, the second patent having issued after the filing of suit on the first").
139 282 F.2d 653 (7th Cir. 1960).
'10

Id. at 656.

141 Id. at 657.
142 Id.

11 Id. at 663, 678.

144 Id. at 657-58.
145 Id. at 658.
116 Id.

147 Id. at 658-59. Significantly, Union Carbide argued that Lincoln had failed to inform its
counsel that its flux was "copied" from the teachings of the patent. Id. at 659. The trial court
seemed to embrace that theory, going so far as to state that Lincoln's failure to advise counsel that it
had "copied" showed that it was aware of possible infringement, because otherwise it would not have
sought patent counsel's advice. Id. at 660. The Seventh Circuit disagreed, finding good faith
reliance on opinion of counsel and noting that obtaining a competitor's product for analysis could
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what "copying" must be judged against, if the doctrine of equivalents is the only
grounds for infringement liability, "copying" is apparently not put in play as a basis
148
for finding willfulness.
As noted, some courts clearly have focused on whether the claimed invention is
what has been "copied." In VNUS Medical Technologies, Inc. v. Diomed Holdings,
Inc.,149 the three defendants jointly moved for summary judgment of no willful
infringement. 150 VNUS opposed the motion, arguing that there was evidence in the
form of deposition testimony and statements made in 501(k) statements that
supported a finding of willful infringement under the standard set forth in In re
Seagate.15 1 The court granted the motion with respect to two of the defendants
because the evidence pertaining to those two defendants, even if true, did not
establish "copying" of the claims of the asserted patent. 152 For example, with regard
to the evidence against one of the defendants, the court stated:
The above-referenced statements on which VNUS relies cannot be
reasonably interpreted by a trier of fact as an admission that
AngioDynamics "copied" the patented claims .... The statement by biolitec
in its Form 501(k) cannot be understood as a representation pertaining to
the patented claims. Additionally, the above-referenced testimony by
AngioDynamic's expert does not make reference to AngioDynamics, let
153
alone suggest AngioDynamics copied the claimed methods ....
The court denied the motion with respect to one of the three defendants because
the proffered evidence did relate to "copying" of the claims. 154 Hence, the court was
clearly focused on whether the claims were copied, not the plaintiffs products or the
specification of the asserted patent.
A similar analysis was performed in Amsted Industries, Inc. v. Buckeye Steel
Castings Co.155 The trial court discussed Buckeye's admitted "copying" of Amsted's
patent in deciding whether to award, and ultimately awarding, enhanced damages
through application of the Read Corp. factors. 156 The court noted that Buckeye's
deviations from the invention did not avoid the fact that it deliberately copied the
patented invention. 157 This, coupled with the fact that Buckeye did not have a good

have been done for the purpose of copying as much as for the purpose of designing a product around
the scope of the patent's claims. Id.
148

Id.

49

No. C-05-2972 MMC, 2007 WL 3165548 (N.D. Cal. Oct 24, 2007).
150 Id. at * 1.
1

151 Id.
52

1

Id. at * 1-2.

153

Id. at *1 (emphasis added).
Id. at *3-4. The court stated, "a trier of fact could reasonably find that the defendant had

154

obtained actual knowledge of plaintiffs patentedmethods." Id. at *3 (emphasis added).
155 28 U.S.P.Q.2d 1352 (N.D. Ill. 1993).
156 Id. at 1354. The patent related to the under-frame of a railway car, and had five elements.
Id. at 1353. Buckeye sold only one of those elements-the center plate-to customers who
assembled that element, along with the remaining elements, into a combination that infringed the
patent. -d.
157 Id. at 1354-55.
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faith belief that the patent was invalid, supported the finding that Buckeye's
15
infringement was willful. S
Based on these cases, it would seem that mere "copying" a competitive product
cannot per se lead to enhanced liability and the other punishments of willful
infringement. Or can it, under Read Corp.'s footnote seven, if broadly read? Such a
broad reading of Read Corp.'s footnote seven seems inconsistent with other Federal
Circuit precedent finding that the deciding factor is where the "copy" falls with
respect to the claims of the patent in issue. Consider Rawlplug Co. v. Illinois Tool
Works, Inc. 159 There, an Illinois Tool Works ("ITW") employee obtained a copy of the
Rawl Spike, Rawlplug's commercial product made under exclusive license to the '445
patent-in-suit, and a copy of the '445 patent, "with the intent of developing a
competing product that would not infringe on Rawlplug's pending patents." 160 The
court found nothing improper about such activities:
As pointed out above, ITW knew all about the Rawl Spike and intended
to copy it without infringement of the patent. However "keeping track of a
competitor's products and designing new and possibly better or cheaper
functional equivalents is the stuff of which competition is made and is
supposed to benefit the consumer." Such conduct, in and of itself, is not
sanctionable because "[o]ne of the benefits of a patent system is its so-called
,negative incentive' to 'design around' a competitor's products, even when
they are patented, thus bringing a steady flow of innovations to the
marketplace."
The essential question before the court, then, is did ITW
successfully "design around" and avoid the claims of the Rawlplug
161
patents?
In State Industries, the accused infringer designed its "copied" product in
response to the introduction of the patentee's product onto the market. 162 The
infringer introduced its product before issuance of the patent, and in fact the
patentee added claims in a continuation-in-part application for the specific purpose of
covering the accused infringer's product. 163 After issuance of the patent, the patentee
almost immediately filed suit, which was the accused infringer's first notice of the
patent.164 The Federal Circuit reasoned that the "patent pending" notice on the
initial product gave no notice of what the patentee might claim in its patent. 165 Also,
while the accused infringer knew of a prior patent that had issued on a parent
158 Id. But ef Vandenberg v. Dairy Equip. Co., 740 F.2d 1560, 1567 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
The
record established that DEC had used the exact dimensions from the patent in designing the
infringing system, but because the dimensions were not claimed, the court found that the "copying"
of the patent was not strong evidence of nonobviousness. Id.
159 23 U.S.P.Q.2d 1054 (S.D.N.Y. 1992), rev'don other ground, 11 F.3d 1036 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
160 Id. at 1056.
161 d. at 1057 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
162 State Indus., Inc. v. A.O. Smith Corp., 751 F.2d 1226, 1230 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
163 Id. at 1235-36.
164 Id. at 1236.
165 Id.
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application to that of the patent-in-suit, the latter did not have claims covering the
infringer's product. 166 Willfulness was not found, because the patent contained
claims which the "copy" infringed had not been known to the accused infringer until
suit was filed.167

Similarly, in American Original Corp. v. Jenkins Food Corp.,168 the court
affirmed the trial court's refusal to find willfulness because the facts established that
Jenkins could not have "copied" the Marvin patent because the patent had not yet
issued when Jenkins installed its original eviscerator. 169 Lack of willfulness was also
supported by evidence that once the Marvin patent was brought to Jenkins'
attention, it responded by altering its system in the hope of avoiding infringement. 170
That the claimed invention is what must be copied is supported by the Federal
Circuit's decision in Hilton-Davis Chemical Co. v. Warner-Jenkinson Co., 17 1 as well
as the Supreme Court's review of that decision. 172 These cases are consistent in that
the focus of what is being "copied" is the claimed invention, although there are a few
loose references to the terms "product" and "someone else's invention." 173 While the
decisions in Hilton Davis dealt with "copying" as it relates to the doctrine of
equivalents, it would seem unlikely that the requirements for what is being "copied"
would be different for considerations of willfulness. Without making it the focus of
the opinion, then, the Court helped resolve the uncertainty about what must be
"copied" to be relevant.
Thus, with the exception of the Read Corp. footnote seven comment that
prohibited "copying" that extends to the ideas or design of another outside the
elements of a patent claim, such as the "copying" of the patentee's commercial
embodiment, the Federal Circuit precedent appears to establish that prohibited
"copying" must be of the literally claimed invention for it to serve as a precursor to or
elements of willfulness. When the "copying" is of a product that is covered by the
claims only under the doctrine of equivalents, the situation is unclear, but Union
Carbide, if adopted or followed by the Federal Circuit on this point, holds such
"copying" not to be a willfulness precursor. Such a view also conforms to McCarthy's
discussion of "copying" theory and the interface between intellectual property rights
and the public domain.
Taken on its face, Read Corp. disturbs this seeming symmetry of result, because
the ideas or design of another cannot be protected by the right to exclude afforded by
the patent law if they are not embraced by at least one issued claim. The weight to
166 Jd. at 1234.
107 Id. at 1236.
168 774 F.2d 459 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
169 Id. at 465; see also Specialty Composites v. Cabot Corp., 845 F.2d 981, 989 (Fed. Cir. 1988);
Panduit Corp. v. Dennison Mfg. Co., 810 F.2d 1561, 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1987); Stratoflex, Inc. v.
Aeroquip Corp., 713 F.2d 1530, 1541 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
170Am. Original,774 F.3d at 465; e£ Power Lift, Inc. v. Lang Tools, Inc., 774 F.2d 478, 481
(Fed. Cir. 1985) (describing Lang's lift system being based upon Power Lift's blow out preventer
system already in use). Lang's son made measurements of Power Lift winches and drums and
designed a system without knowledge of Power Lift's patent application. Id. Claim 15 of the issued
patent covers Lang Tool's lift system, and therefore, implicitly, the claims also cover the Power Lift
System. Id.
17162 F.3d 1512 (Fed. Cir. 1995), rev'd, 520 U.S. 17 (1997).
172Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17 (1997).
173 See, e.g, Warner-Jenkinson,62 F.3d at 1548.
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be given footnote seven is confused, too, because what was "copied" in Read Corp.,
Read's commercial device, was found to be covered, it appears literally, by the
patent's claims. With Read Corp. extant, however, in the as-yet unsettled In re
Seagate world, a cautious accused infringer must look to his bona fides of conduct
under the "totality of circumstances" test, as to the second part of the willfulness
standard, if he jumps off from what then or later turns out to be a product related to
an issued U.S. patent. This plainly causes great uncertainty with great risk, and
potentially little fault to vest the risk-another manifestation of the curse of
"copying."

D. "COPYING" AND OBVIOUSNESS
A second area of law that has been significantly affected by the issue of "copying"
is obviousness. Cases seemingly without exception identify "copying" as a secondary
consideration tending to establish nonobviousness.17 4 Indeed, evidence of "copying" is
175
often considered "the most probative and cogent evidence of nonobviousness."
The U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Diamond Rubber Co. v. Consolidated
Rubber Tire Co.1 76 is the progenitor of this line of authority.1 7 7 There, Consolidated
Rubber Tire "copied" the Grant tire,1 78 with what must have been the unintended
result of affording Mr. Justice McKenna the opportunity to put an eloquently-turned
sentence into the patent precedent:
The prior art was open to the rubber company. That "art was crowded," it
says, "with numerous prototypes and predecessors" of the Grant tire, and
they, it if [sic] insisted, possessed all of the qualities which the dreams of
experts attributed to the Grant tire. And yet the rubber company uses the
Grant tire. It gives the tribute of its praise to the prior art; it gives the
179
Grant tire the tribute ofits imitation, as othershave done.

17'
See, e.g., Iron Grip Barbell Co. v. USA Sports, Inc., 392 F.3d 1317, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2005);
Akamai Techs., Inc. v. Cable & Wireless Internet Servs., Inc., 344 F.3d 1186, 1196 (Fed. Cir. 2003);

Advanced Display Sys., Inc. v. Kent State Univ., 212 F.3d 1272, 1285 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
175Advanced Display,212 F.3d at 1285 ("Objective considerations such as failure by others to
solve the problem and copying, may often be the most probative and cogent evidence of
nonobviousness.") (citations omitted).
176220 U.S. 428 (1911).
177
See 2 CHISUM, supra note 40, § 5.05[5].
17sDiamond Rubber,220 U.S. at 429. "Grant tire" refers to the patent at suit which was issued

to Arthur W. Grant on February 18, 1896 for an improvement in rubber tires. Id.
17') Id.
at 441 (emphasis added). The Fifth Circuit embellished on the phrase, "imitation is the
sincerest form of flattery," in Ingersoll-Rand Co. v.Brunner & Lay, Inc., 474 F.2d 491, 497 (5th Cir.
1973). See also Copease Mfg. Co. v. Am. Photocopy Equip. Co., 298 F.2d 772, 781 (7th Cir. 1961)
(finding that '[t]he prior art upon which defendant now lavishes its praise was apparently permitted
to lie dormant until the exigency, created by a suit for infringement, required its resurrection," and
'[d]efendant's imitation of the patent structure is another indication of invention"); Kurtz v. Belle
Hat Lining Co., 280 F. 277, 281 (2d Cir. 1922) ("The imitation of a thing patented by a defendant,
who denies invention, has often been regarded.., as conclusive evidence of what the defendant
thinks of the patent, and persuasive of what the rest of the world ought to think.").
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The Court continued its focus on "copying" in Graham v. John Deere Co. 180
where the "secondary considerations" included objective evidence of nonobviousness
of the claimed invention, such as commercial success, long felt but unsolved need,
failure of others, unexpected results-and "copying." 181
The effect of "copying" on an accused infringer's allegations of invalidity were
aptly summarized by Chief Judge Markey in an early Federal Circuit decision,
Stratolex, Inc. v. Aeroqui&Corp.182:
[A] finding that a claimed invention has or has not been appropriated by the
alleged infringer may carry substantial weight in a court's analysis of all
the evidence bearing on the obvious-nonobvious issue.
An alleged
infringer's lauding of all the available prior art may, for example, in some
cases have a hollow ring when played against its disregard of that art and
18 3
its copying of the invention.
The Federal Circuit has carried this concept through in a number of its
18 5
decisions.18 4 Advanced Display Systems, Inc. v. Kent State University,
shows just

180 383
181 Id.

U.S. 1 (1966).
at 18.

182 713 F.2d 1530 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
183 Id. at 1541.
184 See, e.g., Iron Grip Barbell Co. v. USA Sports, Inc., 392 F.3d 1317, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2005)
(0]ur cases ... establish that copying by a competitor may be a relevant consideration in the
secondary factor analysis" of nonobviousness); Akamai Techs., Inc. v. Cable & Wireless Internet
Servs., Inc., 344 F.3d 1186, 1193, 1196 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
[T]he record contains substantial evidence relating to secondary considerations
supporting the jury's verdict. In particular, the record shows that C&W expended
significant effort to determine how Akamai's products worked ... The [ir] new
Footprint 2.0 design incorporated Akamai's placement of the load balancing
mechanism at the DNS server. This evidence of copying is relevant to an
obviousness determination.
d. at 1196; Advanced Display Sys., Inc. v. Kent State Univ., 212 F.3d 1272, 1285 (Fed. Cir. 2000)
(finding that "copying of the claimed invention" provided "compelling evidence of nonobviousness");
Diversitech Corp. v. Century Steps, Inc., 850 F.2d 675, 679 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (finding the trial court
erred in declining to include the objective evidence of admitted copying in its determination of the
issue of obviousness"); Avia Group Intl, Inc. v. L.A. Gear Cal., Inc., 853 F.2d 1557, 1564 (Fed. Cir.
1988) ("Copying is additional evidence of nonobviousness."); Specialty Composites v. Cabot Corp.,
845 F.2d 981, 991 (Fed. Cir. 1988) ("Copying the claimed invention, rather than one in the public
domain, is indicative of unobviousness."); Windsurfing Int'l, Inc. v. AMF Inc., 782 F.2d 995, 1000
(Fed. Cir. 1986), furtherproceedingsat 668 F. Supp. 812 (S.D.N.Y. 1987); Custom Accessories, Inc.
v. Jeffrey-Allan Indus., Inc., 807 F.2d 955, 960 (Fed. Cir. 1986) ("When present, such objective
evidence [of copying] must be considered."); Water Techs. Corp. v. Calco Ltd., 658 F. Supp. 961, 970
(N.D. Ill. 1986) ("Copying of the patented inventions is strong evidence of non-obviousness of the
patents in suit."), on motion to amendjudgment, 658 F. Supp. 980 (N.D. Ill. 1987), affd in part,rev'd
in part, 850 F.2d 660 (Fed. Cir. 1988); Panduit Corp. v. Dennison Mfg. Co., 774 F.2d 1082, 1099
(Fed. Cir. 1985) ("That Dennison, a large corporation with many engineers on its staff, did not copy
any prior art device, but found it necessary to copy the cable tie of the claims in suit, is equally
strong evidence of nonobviousness."), vacated sub nom., Dennison Mfg. Co. v. Panduit Corp., 475
U.S. 809 (1986), remanded to 810 F.2d 1561 (Fed. Cir. 1987); Ashland Oil, Inc. v. Delta Resins &
Refractories, Inc., 776 F.2d 281, 290-91 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (holding that secondary considerations,
such as copying cannot be ignored in obviousness analysis); W.L. Gore & Assocs., Inc. v. Garlock,
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how powerful evidence of "copying" can be. 186 In that case, the defendant requested a
8
new trial based on newly-discovered evidence of "copying" and failure of others.' '
The newly-discovered evidence was a deposition transcript from a different case that
had not been produced during discovery, despite a document request that covered
materials from that litigation. 188 The Federal Circuit found that the new evidence of
"wholesale copying" was "compelling," "potentially outcome determinative," and,
therefore, warranted a new trial. 189 Also evident from the decision in Advanced
Display, is that incidents of "copying" after independent development was tried and
failed are of particular help in establishing nonobviousness. 190
A contention that it may be commonplace in the industry for manufacturers to
copy each other's designs will not defeat the effects of "copying" as objective evidence
of nonobviousness. In L.A. Gear, Inc. v. Thom MeAn Shoe Co., 191 the infringer

Inc., 721 F.2d 1540, 1559 (Fed. Cir. 1983), remanded to 670 F. Supp. 760, affdinpart,rev'din part,
842 F.2d 1275 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
185 212 F.3d 1272.

186 Id. at 1272.
187 Id. at 1284-85.

188 Id. at 1280.
189 Id. at 1285 (emphasis added); e. Ecolochem, Inc. v. S. Cal. Edison Co., 227 F.3d 1361, 1380
(Fed. Cir. 2000) (stating that copying is "only equivocal evidence of non-obviousness in the absence
of more compelling objective indicia of other secondary considerations"); In -r GPAC, 57 F.3d 1573,

1580 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (stating that "more than the mere fact of copying by an accused infringer is
needed to make that action significant to a determination of the obviousness issue").
190 Advaneed Display,212 F.3d at 1285-86 ("The import of such copying evidence merits even
greater weight in view of ADS's failure to develop independently the claimed invention."); see also
Dow Chem. Co. v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 816 F.2d 617 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (holding nonobviousness was
supported by evidence of acts of the infringer in trying but failing to "develop the claimed invention
and [then] copied it instead"; Cyanamid was unable to develop its own commercial process based on
the prior art); Heidelberger Druckmaschinen AG v. Hantscho Commercial Prods., Inc., 21 F.3d 1068,
1072 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (finding that "the litigation argument that an innovation is really quite
ordinary carries diminished weight when offered by those who had tried and failed to solve the same
problem, and then promptly adopted the solution that they are now denigrating"); Panduit Corp. v.
Dennison Mfg. Co., 810 F.2d 1561, 1571 (Fed. Cir. 1987) ("Dennison's obviousness defense is clearly
refuted in this case by the unrefuted record of its own long and frustrating experience and that of
others."); Vandenberg v. Dairy Equip. Co., 740 F.2d 1560, 1567 (Fed. Cir. 1984) ("The copying of an
invention may constitute evidence that the invention is not an obvious one.... This would be
particularly true where the copyist had itself attempted for a substantial length of time to design a
similar device, and had failed."); Lam, Inc. v. Johns-Manville Corp., 668 F.2d 462, 467-68, 474-76
(10th Cir. 1982) (rejecting defendant's obviousness contentions in part because the evidence showed
that defendant copied plaintiffs invention "after years" of trying unsuccessfully to develop its own
product); ef In re GPAC, 57 F.3d at 1580 (giving "little weight" to "widespread failure of others to
develop alternatives to the Natale patent as evidence of nonobviousness" because GPAC offered no
evidence to tie the failure to the subject matter claimed in that patent); Pentec, Inc. v. Graphic
Controls Corp., 776 F.2d 309, 317 (Fed. Cir. 1985) ("In the present case, Pentec's effort to develop
their own solution was not shown to have been extensive, its product is not identical to the claimed
invention, and it vigorously denied infringement. GC's copying argument can, accordingly, be given
little weight."); Vandenherg; 740 F.2d at 1567 (noting that because the accused infringer had given
the project low priority and had not totally failed in its independent efforts, the accusation of
'slavish copying" overstated the case); Deere & Co. v. Hesston Corp., 440 F.2d 904, 907 ("It is a
peculiarity of patent law that it avails Deere [the patent owner] nothing to point out that the
combination was not obvious to defendant's engineers who gave up and copied Deere's machine.").
191 988 F.2d 1117 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
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admitted "copying" the inventor's shoe designs. 192 The only justification offered for
'
the admitted "copying" was "that copying is prevalent in the fashion industry. 193
This argument was rejected by the Federal Circuit, and the infringer's "copying" was
deemed strong evidence of willful infringement. 194
"Copying" is not, despite the tenor of these cases, dispositive of
nonobviousness. 195 Additionally, as with all secondary considerations or objective
evidence, a nexus with the claimed invention must be proved. 196
The theoretical underpinnings of the "copy = nonobvious" equation are in many
respects ill-developed. If the claimed subject matter is or was obvious, "copying" was
entirely proper and Constitutionally guaranteed, as it were. 197 As obviousness is
judged by the hypothetical man of ordinary skill in the art, the less-than-omniscient,
real-life "copyist" may not be reflective of the Graham standard viewed through the
proper eyes. 198 Additionally, "copying" may occur from bases that are hard to work
192

Id. at 1126-27.

193

Id.

Id. at 1127; see also Benchcraft, Inc. v. Broyhill Furniture Indus., Inc., 681 F. Supp. 1190,
1206 (N.D. Miss. 1988).
19 5
Amazon.com, Inc. v. Barnesandnoble.com, Inc., 239 F.3d 1343, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2001)
(holding evidence of copying was not sufficient to demonstrate nonobviousness, in view of the
substantial question of validity raised by the prior art references cited); Ecolochem, Inc. v. S. Cal.
Edison Co., 227 F.3d 1361, 1380-81, (Fed. Cir. 2000) (holding that the district court committed clear
error in not considering the evidence of copying, but finding evidence of copying of a particular claim
was outweighed by other secondary considerations and findings on the prior art; nonetheless,
affirming the district court's finding of obviousness for that particular claim); In re GPAC, Inc., 57
F.3d at 1580 ("[M]ore than the mere fact of copying by an accused infringer is needed to make that
action significant to a determination of the obviousness issue." (quoting Cable Elec. Prods. Inc. v.
Genmark, Inc., 770 F.2d 1015, 1028 (Fed. Cir. 1985))); Newell Cos., v. Kenney Mfg. Co., 864 F.2d
757, 768 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (holding that nonobviousness cannot be inferred from evidence of copying,
and although commercial success, copying and other secondary considerations must be considered,
"they do not control the obviousness conclusion"); Leinoffv. Louis Milona & Sons, Inc., 726 F.2d 734,
740 (Fed. Cir. 1984) ("Although this evidence often helps a tribunal determine an invention's
nonobviousness, it is not necessarily conclusive.").
196 Amazon.com, 239 F.3d at 1366 (noting that "evidence of copying.., is legally irrelevant
unless the... [relevant] feature is shown to be an embodiment of the claims"); n rre GPAC, 57 F.3d
at 1580 (explaining that "[f]or objective evidence to be accorded substantial weight, its proponent
must establish a nexus between the evidence and the merits of the claimed invention" (citing
Stratoflex, Inc. v. Aeroquip Corp., 713 F.2d 1530, 1539 (Fed. Cir. 1983))); Cable Elee. Prods., 770
F.2d at 1026.
197 See, e.g., Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 231 (1964) ("An unpatentable
article ... is in the public domain and may be made or sold by whoever chooses to do so."); Rite-Hite
Corp. v. Kelley Co., 629 F. Supp. 1042, 1051 (E.D. Wis. 1986) ("The very foundation of the patent
system contemplates that users of a basic patent will make improvements with time."), affd, 819
F.2d 1120 (Fed. Cir. 1987); Dollar Elec. Co. v. Syndevco, Inc., 205 U.S.P.Q. 949, 964 (E.D. Mich.
1979) ("[N]othing prevents copying an unpatentable device."), affd, 669 F.2d 1370 (6th Cir. 1982);
Janex Corp. v. Bradley Time, 460 F. Supp. 383, 389 n.10 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) ("While copying may be
powerful evidence of nonobviousness, it remains the case that nothing deters a competitor from
borrowing from a product not covered by a valid patent." (citing Kurtz v. Belle Hat Lining Co., 280
F. 277, 281 (2d Cir. 1922))).
198 Amazon.corn, 239 F.3d at 1364 (holding that the district court erred in substituting the
testimony of an expert about his personal view for what a hypothetical ordinarily skilled artisan
would have gleaned from the cited references at the time that the patent application was filed); see
also Mfrs. Sys., Inc. v. ADM Indus., Inc., 198 U.S.P.Q. 223, 250 (N.D. Ind. 1978) ("MSI ... contends
that if asserted Claim 8 is so obvious, why did defendant ADM have to copy. This argument is,
194
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into the Graham standards. 199 Chisum has argued that little weight should be given
to "copying" in the determination of nonobviousness:
It would seem that copying and laudatory statements by an infringer should
be given little if any weight in determining nonobviousness. First, it is not
necessarily inconsistent for a person to see value in an innovation yet deny
its patentability on technical grounds.
Second, public policy favors
challenges to the validity of patents, and no defendant in an infringement
suit should be placed under a special handicap in raising the issue. As
Judge Hand noted, "there is more at stake than the issues between the two
parties." 200

Echoing these views, the Federal Circuit in Cable Electric Products, Inc. v.
Genmark, Inc. 20 1 discussed the disparity of reasons that one might copy an
invention. 20 2 There, the court noted that copying could occur out of a general lack of
concern for patent property, in which case its effect would be neutral on the
obviousness analysis. 203 Or, it may occur out of contempt for the specific patent in
question, thus, only arguably demonstrating obviousness. 20 4 As still another
alternative, copying might be more related to the ability or willingness of the
patentee financially or otherwise to enforce the patent right, which would call for
deeper inquiry to determine its applicability to the obviousness analysis. 20 5 The
court noted that even widespread copying could weigh toward opposite conclusions,
depending on the attitudes existing toward patent property and the accepted
practices in the industry in question. 20 6 The court therefore concluded that the idea
that copying per se should bolster the validity of a patent was a "simplistic" view. 207
Be that as it may, the Federal Circuit continues to accept objective evidence as
probative of nonobviousness, including "copying" of the claimed invention when
proper nexus is shown. Such evidence is of particular significance now that the
Supreme Court has unanimously rejected the long-standing obviousness test used by
the Federal Circuit in favor of a broader and more flexible test for determining

however, based on a faulty premise, namely, that the defendant ADM is in the same position as the
'statutory' man of ordinary skill under 35 USC [§] 103."), aft'd,615 F.2d 741 (7th Cir. 1979).
199 See, e.g., Ecolochem, 227 F.3d at 1380 (explaining "copying 'could have occurred out of a
general lack of concern for patent property' (quoting Cable Elec. Prods., 720 F.2d at 1028)); Creative
Pioneer Prods. Corp. v. K Mart Corp., 5 U.S.P.Q.2d 1841, 1844 (S.D. Tex. 1986) ("Copying ... may
result from indifference or even a lack of awareness of a patent owner's rights or disregard for his
ability to enforce them." (citing Cable Elee. Prods., 720 F.2d at 1026-28)); U.S. Tel. Co. v. Am.
Telecomms. Corp., 204 U.S.P.Q. 951, 957 (D. Conn. 1979) (noting that copying in the telephone
industry was pervasive because the industry relied on AT&T approval in adopting new telephone
models).
200 2 CHISUM, supra note 40, § 5.05(5)(d).
201 770 F.2d 1015 (Fed. Cir. 1985), overruled on other grounds as recognizedin Midwest Indus,
Inc. v. Karavan Trailers, Inc., 175 F.3d 1356 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (en banc)).
202 Id. at 1027-28.
203 Id. at 1028.
204

Id.

205 Id.
2006Id.
207

Id. (affirming the trial court's grant of summary judgment of obviousness).
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whether subject matter is obvious. 208 In view of KSR International Co. v. Teleflex
Ine.,20 9 a larger percentage of patents may be deemed prima facie obvious, making
objective evidence, such as "copying," more important than ever. In the post KSRera, one should expect that litigant patent owners will conjure up evidence of
"copying" whenever possible, and try to use it aggressively to maintain the validity of
their patents.

E.

LIFTING THE "CURSE" OF "COPYING"

Not surprisingly, a number of rationales for "copying" activity have been tried
out over the years. A very few "work"; most don't; particularly in front of a jury,
many of whom used "the dog ate my homework" to try to explain why what they
handed in at school as theirs, looked so much like their friend's/brother's (sister)'s.
For example, the respondent in In re Certain Crystalline Cefadroxil Monohydrate210
contended that its "copying" activity was solely the result of its intention to facilitate
the process of obtaining Food and Drug Administration approval. 211 It was noted,
21 2
with tongue surely in cheek, that "other factors influenced that decision as well."
The effect of evidence of "copying" upon the patentee's case is usually an excuse
for celebration. As one commentator noted, "any evidence of copying is pure gold
because of its relevance to infringement, obviousness, and willful infringement, not to
mention the psychological effect on the trier-of-fact." 21 3 Use of the "copying" evidence
before the jury should be maximized, but care should be taken not to overplay the
hand:
After telling the story of the invention, one should tell the story of the
defendant's conduct, typically how defendants came second to the market,
how defendants upset the inventors' plans and hard work, how they reaped
the commercial reward without doing any of the original creative work or
taking any of the risks plaintiff took to develop the market. If you can
establish copying or derivation by defendants, by all means emphasize it at
this point, although with a jury you have to be careful not to get too bogged
down in factual disputes about copying to the point that the jury begins to
214
think copying is part of your burden of proof.
The accused infringer must present a credible response to charges of and
evidence tending to show "copying." Ignoring it, or denying it when a denial is not
credible, is not the recommended way to approach the problem. Denying "copying,"
208 See KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 127 S.Ct. 1727 (2007).
209 Id.
210

15 U.S.P.Q.2d 1263 (U.S. Int'1. Trade Comm'n 1990).

211

Id. at 1271.
Id.

212

213 Jack L. Slobodin, What To do From Getting the Case to Trial:An Overview for the Patent
Infringement TrialLawyer,375 PAT. LITIG. 43, 84 (1993).
214 George R. Badenoch, Trial of InfringementIssues: How to Prove Infringement and
Noninfringement, in PATENT LITIGATION 1993 at 393, 413 (PLI Pats., Copyrights, Trademarks, &
Literary Prop. Course, Handbook Ser. No. 375, 1993), available atWL, 375 PLI/Pat 393.
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when evidence to the contrary exists, can destroy credibility. 215 If you copied, it is
better to admit it, but explain that there is nothing wrong with copying under the
right circumstances:
Jurors can be educated that copying and building upon the knowledge of
others is the essence of our society. If we did not copy we would not learn.
For example, we would not learn language if we did not copy. We would not
learn to ride a bicycle or recite poetry if we did not copy. Educational
advancement in our society is predicated upon building on the shoulders of
others. Supreme Court decisions, like Sears, Compco, Bonito Boats, and
others recognize the value in taking the knowledge of others as a starting
point to build. Indeed the patent system recognizes this. So the argument
goes.... The point is if you have copied, admit it and move on.
216
Unreasonable denials dilute your effectiveness as an advocate.
Another approach where "copying" is raised is to emphasize that it is the claims
that must be focused upon to gauge the accused infringer's alleged infringement:
emphasize the defendant's innocence, the limited scope of the invention, and, if there
was a substantial and successful design around effort, emphasize that the design
217
falls outside the claims.
There are also explanations and excuses that may avoid "copying"-based
willfulness. In Micro Motion Inc. v. ExaC Corp.,2 18 for example, Micro Motion
introduced significant evidence indicating that Exac's designers had access to Micro
Motion's technology while they were designing Exac's infringing Coriolis
flowmeter. 2 19 Drs. Young and Dahlin, Exac's founders and designers, had gained
experience with Micro Motion's C meter and they had obtained copies of Exac
patents, including the patent which was reissued into the patent-in-suit. 220 By the
end of 1982, the court noted, the doctors had gained experience with Micro Motion's
C meter. 221 In June 1983, Dr. Dahlin obtained information on and drawings of the
Micro Motion D meter through a Mr. Bottom. 222 Additionally, Dr. Dahlin received a
Micro Motion C meter in August 1983 and a D meter in December 1983 from a Mr.
223
Tanner.
This would not have been thought to look too good for Drs. Dahlin and Young,
but a rational explanation was at hand:

215 Edmund J. Sease, Ten Commandments of a Defendants Patent Case, in PATENT
LITIGATION 1993 at 603, 618 (PLI Pats., Copyrights, Trademarks, & Literary Prop. Course,
Handbook Ser. No. 375, 1993), available atWL, 375 PLI/Pat 603.
21;Id.
217 Badenoch, supra note 214, at 430-31 ([I]t is particularly helpful to separate plaintiffs own

products from the claimed invention if you can, so that nobody's success can be attributed to the
patent. The patent then becomes an unimportant and irrelevant diversion in a commercial business
story that has nothing to do with it.").
218 761 F. Supp. 1420 (N.D. Cal. 1991).
219 Id. at 1437.
220Id.
221 Id.
222 Id.
223

Id.
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Exac... introduced evidence that Drs. Dablin and Young obtained
information on Micro Motion s patents so that they could ensure that the
device they developed would not conflict with Micro Motion ' patents. This
assertion is reasonable given Drs. Young and Dablin's strong financial
interestin developing a patentableproduct.At trial, Dr. Young testified to
the design differences that he felt distinguished the Exac device from Micro
Motion's. Based on the testimony of Dr. Young and Mr. Swanson [Exac's
CEO], the Court believes that Exac did not intentionally copy Micro
2 24
Motion's design.
What seemed to be damning evidence of willful infringement was, instead, portrayed
for the jury as the accused infringer's conscientious efforts to avoid infringement.

CONCLUSION
The curse of "copying" is quite real and powerful, especially where a jury of one's
peers is sitting as the trier of fact in patent litigation. Patentees will try to take
advantage of this curse much more often given the recent holdings in KSR and In re
Seagate. Lifting the curse requires care and some courage at trial, in view of a
precedential framework that is less than favorable to the accused infringer and the
pejorative impact the term "copy" or the cry of "copy cat" will likely have on the jury
and the court, if supporting evidence can be adduced. In the context of willful
infringement, the "objective recklessness" standard, the "totality of the
circumstances," and the patentee's clear and convincing evidence burden must
always be kept in view, and an accused infringer's good faith established, or vitiated,
particularly regarding appropriate opinions of counsel or the lack thereof. With
enhanced damages and attorneys' fees, as well as bolstering the nonobviousness of
the alleged invention in the balance, knowledge of the law and its uncertainties
should help swing the scales in favor of one's client. But be warned that "copying"
runs the razor's edge, and will continue to do so for the foreseeable future.

224

Id. (emphasis added) (citations omitted).

